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INTRODUCTION 
Debit and credit cards, or electronic payment cards, occupy an 
increasingly important role as forms of payment in the United States.
1
 
These card payment transactions are processed in a complex manner 
involving multiple components. One of the most important components 
in a typical card payment transaction is referred to as the interchange 
fee.
2
 It is the largest part of a fee that merchants are obligated to pay on 
every card transaction, and it is paid to the banks that issue debit and 
credit cards.
3
 However, the consumer—the driver of each and every 
transaction—is largely unaware of the interchange fee’s existence, 
much less its importance or effect. On the other hand, merchants, card-
issuing banks, and card networks—for example, Visa—are well aware 
of its existence, and all are fighting, both in the federal courts
4
 and in 
Congress
5
 over the future of this fee. 
 
 
 
1 There were 65.5 billion electronic payment card transactions in 2009, all of which 
incurred an interchange fee. See FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE 
PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006-2009 4 (Apr. 
5, 2011) [hereinafter FED PAYMENTS STUDY], available at 
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_payments_study.pdf. The 
total number of transactions in 2009 increased 31% over the number of similar transactions 
made in 2006. See id. While the number of credit card transactions has remained relatively 
static, debit card usage has increased dramatically, thus driving the increase. See id. Credit 
card transactions alone were estimated to account for 26% of the dollar value of goods and 
services purchased in 2006. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card 
Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1326-27 (2008). Debit and prepaid card 
transactions in 2009 were valued at $1.4 trillion. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM, 2009 INTERCHANGE REVENUE, COVERED ISSUER COST, AND COVERED 
ISSUER AND MERCHANT FRAUD LOSS RELATED TO DEBIT CARD TRANSACTIONS 6 (June 2011) 
[hereinafter FED SURVEY], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/debitfees_costs.pdf. 
2 See Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan, Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card 
Markets: What Role for Public Authorities?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., 
1st Quarter 2006, at 87 (“Interchange fees are an integral part of the pricing structure of 
credit and debit card transactions.”). 
3 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-45, CREDIT CARDS: RISING 
INTERCHANGE FEES HAVE INCREASED COSTS FOR MERCHANTS BUT OPTIONS FOR REDUCING 
FEES POSE CHALLENGES 6 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-45. 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Express Co., 2011 WL 2974094 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 
2011). 
5 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203 § 1075, 124 Stat. 2060 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2006)). 
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Interchange fees are important to all parties involved in a card 
payment transaction. For card-issuing banks, interchange fees are an 
enormous source of revenue
6
 and are used by card networks as a carrot 
to induce banks to issue cards on their network.
7
 To merchants, 
interchange fees represent the largest transactional cost associated with 
accepting debit and credit cards.
8
  Because this cost is factored into 
every card-accepting merchant’s cost of business, consumers feel the 
effects of interchange fees in the form of higher priced goods and 
services.
9
 In addition, because not all consumers pay using debit and 
credit cards, those that choose to use other forms of payment such as 
cash or check are paying higher prices without receiving any sort of 
benefit.
10
 
Over the last few decades, as both card usage and interchange fees 
have skyrocketed, interchange fees have become the subject of scrutiny 
by elected officials, antitrust authorities, and private plaintiffs. 
Intervention into the United States card payment industry has primarily 
taken two forms: direct regulatory intervention and antitrust lawsuits 
against the card networks under the Sherman Act. These forms of 
intervention attack interchange fees using very different approaches. 
Direct regulation such as the Durbin Amendment, a little-known 
amendment to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, has a very direct effect: capping the amount of 
interchange that can be charged on an individual debit transaction.
11
 On 
the other hand, antitrust suits have largely been directed at eliminating 
restrictive operating provisions that card networks indirectly impose on 
merchants, such as the prohibition on charging different prices 
depending on the consumer’s method of payment.
12
 
These two different forms of intervention have only recently come 
to fruition, and their consequences, both for the industry and consumer, 
are still largely unknown. Yet the success or failure of these 
 
6 AMY DAWSON & CARL J. HUGENER, DIAMOND MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
CONSULTANTS, A NEW BUSINESS MODEL FOR CARD PAYMENTS 1 (2006). 
7 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 13. 
8 See id. at 9. 
9 Id. at 27-28. 
10 Id. at 28. 
11 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 
§ 1075, 124 Stat. 2060 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2006)). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Am.Express Co., 2011 WL 2974094 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 
2011). 
MCAVOY ARTICLE_FORMATTED 6.13 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:31 AM 
312 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:2 
interventions will undoubtedly have broad ramifications for consumers, 
merchants, and the card-payment industry. This Article seeks to 
describe the underlying characteristics of the industry and review both 
approaches, both by analyzing theoretical economic justifications and 
reviewing the available scholarship on empirical effects. Thus, this 
Article begins in Part I with the introduction of some background 
information on the payment card industry, including a review of the 
structure of a typical transaction, an overview of the economic theory 
behind interchange fees, a look at some of the important operating 
provisions promulgated by the card networks, and a critical review of 
the industry absent intervention. In Part II, this Article examines the two 
alternative approaches to intervention in the card payment industry—(1) 
direct regulation of interchange fees through the Durbin Amendment 
and (2) antitrust enforcement through the encouragement of 
competition—and compares the benefits and drawbacks of each. 
I. Background: Card Payment Industry 
A. The Structure of Card Payment Systems
13
 
Electronic payment cards, including both debit and credit cards, 
occupy an increasingly important role as a form of payment in the 
United States
14
 and are processed in a complex manner involving 
multiple cost components. In the most typical type of card payment 
transaction, there are five parties involved: the consumer (or 
cardholder), the card-issuing bank (“issuer”) (e.g., Bank of America),
15
 
the card network (typically Visa or MasterCard),
16
 the acquiring 
 
13 The following description of a typical card payment transaction applies to both credit 
and debit cards. For the purposes of this Article, the term “credit cards” will also encompass 
charge cards. 
14 See supra note 1. 
15 The issuer of a debit card is the bank that the cardholder holds an account with. 
Credit cards, while issued by a variety of institutions, are primarily issued by only the 
largest of banks. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 6 (52% of 
outstanding credit card balances in 2008 were held by the top three issuing banks: JP 
Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citibank). 
16 Visa and MasterCard possessed a combined 83% share of the credit card transaction 
market in 2008. Levitin, supra note 1, at 1327 (internal citation omitted). Coincidentally, 
these same companies also possessed 83% of the debit transaction market. Steven C. Salop 
et al., MERCHANT PAYMENTS COALITION, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEBIT CARD REGULATION 
UNDER SECTION 920 at 10 (Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter SALOP-MERCHANTS’ ANALYSIS], 
available at 
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financial institution (“acquirer”),
17
 and the merchant (e.g., Macy’s).
18
 
When a consumer uses either her debit or credit card to make a purchase 
from a merchant, an electronic request for the specific dollar amount of 
the transaction is sent to the acquirer and then forwarded to the card 
network.
19
 The network acts an intermediary between the issuer and the 
acquirer, performing authorization, clearing, and settlement (ACS) 
services.
20
 Once an issuer—the party responsible for funding the 
transaction—authorizes the purchase, the acquirer can then credit the 
merchant’s account for the price of the goods, less a so-called merchant 
discount fee.
21
 The merchant discount fee is divided among the 
institutional participants in the transaction. A small portion is retained 
by the acquirer, a small portion goes to the card network, and the 
majority is paid to the issuer as an interchange fee.
22
 
By way of illustration, a typical electronic payment transaction 
might proceed as follows. First, a consumer making a $100 purchase 
will be charged $100 by his issuing bank, either in the form of a debit 
from his account or in the form of a credit card bill. Next, the acquirer 
will pay the merchant $98 after deducting the merchant discount fee. Of 
the $2 merchant discount fee, the acquirer might retain $0.70 and pass 
on the remaining $1.30. The card network will receive $0.15
23
 in the 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/merchants_payment_coalition_meeting_20
101102.pdf (2010). 
17 The acquirer can be understood as a purchaser of the merchant’s accounts receivable, 
hence, an “acquirer.” Levitin, supra note 1, at 1328. 
18 Some credit card transactions involve only four parties—the card network also acts as 
issuer. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July 20, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). This model is representative of the processing 
system employed by American Express and Discover. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 3, at 8-9. Because the majority of electronic card payments are processed by Visa 
and MasterCard, this section of the Article will illustrate the mechanics of the five-party 
system. The concept of the four-party system is very much the same, except there is no 
additional need for interaction between the card network and the issuer. Further, since the 
elimination of certain exclusivity rules that prevented issuers from issuing cards on the 
American Express and Discover, the distinction has been blurred. Now, American Express 
and Discover process cards on a five-party model as well a four-party model. See infra Part 
II.D.2. 
19 Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,396. 
20 Levitin, supra note 1, at 1328. 
21
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 7. 
22 Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396. 
23 The Federal Reserve Board conducted a legislatively-authorized survey of industry 
participants affected by Durbin Amendment regulations and determined that card networks 
receive an average of $0.11 per debit transaction, in the form of charges to both the acquirer 
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form of processing fees (for coordinating the transaction), and the 
issuing bank will receive $1.15 in the form of an interchange fee.
24
 
In any given transaction, the driving factor in determining the 
merchant discount fee is the interchange fee.
25
 This results from the fact 
that the interchange fee is both the largest cost component of the 
merchant discount fee; the remaining fees are generally set in response 
to interchange.
26
 Interchange fees are unilaterally set by the card 
networks
27
 and vary on the basis of a number of factors related to 
characteristics of the transaction, including the type of card being used 
(e.g., credit versus debit, or high rewards versus low rewards), the type 
of merchant for which the card is being used, the transaction volume of 
the merchant, and the form of processing (e.g., point-of-sale versus over 
the phone, or PIN versus signature).
28
 These factors are believed to both 
account for the risk associated with accepting payment from certain 
types of merchants and provide incentives to certain merchants to 
accept a particular card network’s cards.
29
 
 
 
and the issuer. FED SURVEY, supra note 1, at 12. This example uses $0.15 for the sake of 
simplicity and round numbers. It is worth noting that card networks, such as Visa, dispute 
this characterization of a typical transaction. Visa asserts that the interchange fee is an 
exchange between the acquirer and the issuer. VISA INC., ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2010). 
However, card networks charge both the acquirer and issuer for its ACS services on a 
transaction basis, thus making their fees a relevant component of the entire transaction cost. 
See FED SURVEY, supra note 1, at 8. 
24 The Fed survey found this to be the average interchange fee per debit transaction. FED 
SURVEY, supra note 1, at 8. 
25 Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,396 (July 20, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
26 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1333. 
27 E.g., VISA INC., ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2010). This feature of a payment card 
transaction, a centrally determined interchange fee, came into existence by way of Visa and 
MasterCard’s previous form, a joint venture among member banks, or issuers. See Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of 
Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549, 550 (2002). A coordinated fee 
contributed efficiency and convenience—i.e., avoidance of coordination of pricing amongst 
thousands of member-banks. See id. However, many member banks of Visa were also 
member banks of MasterCard, prompting antitrust scrutiny. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
29 Id. This characterization of the component factors belies the complexity of card 
network’s determination of interchange fees. Card networks categorize merchants into a 
plethora of distinct categories and distinguish between transactions on many bases. See 
generally VISA U.S.A. INTERCHANGE REIMBURSEMENT FEES, VISA INC. (2011), available at 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-usa-interchange-reimbursement-fees-
october2011.pdf (providing the current interchange fee rates as of Oct. 2011). 
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In contrast, acquirers determine their mark-up—their portion of the 
merchant discount fee—by looking to the interchange fee and setting a 
level that incorporates both their processing costs and a margin for 
themselves that is competitive within their segment of the industry. 
Acquirers provide a commodity-like service and thus compete to attract 
merchants primarily on price.
30
 In addition, acquirers bear the risk of 
merchant default due to bankruptcy or otherwise.
31
 Yet, despite bearing 
such risks, acquirers are beholden to card networks and their 
determination of interchange; Card networks, through their 
determination of interchange fees, are in control of the relative costs of 
an electronic payment transaction and thus set the baseline for 
electronic payment fees as a whole.
32
 
Corresponding with the increase in credit and debit card use over 
the last ten years,
33
 alarming increases in interchange fees have been a 
cause for concern among merchants and industry watchers. In 1991, 
Visa and MasterCard’s highest interchange rates were 1.91% and 2.08% 
respectively; in 2009, the highest rates for the companies were 2.95% 
and 3.25%, respectively.
34
 In addition, an estimate from the Federal 
Reserve pegged the total value of interchange fees for Visa and 
MasterCard debit and credit products at $35 billion to $45 billion in 
2007, up from about $20 billion in 2002.
35
 Other estimates pegged 
interchange revenue in 2009 at $62 billion,
36
 indicating a severe upward 
 
30 ANN KJOS, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., THE MERCHANT-ACQUIRING SIDE OF THE 
PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, OPERATIONS, AND CHALLENGES 10 (2007) available 
at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/update-
newsletter/2008/summer/summer08_02.cfm. 
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 9. 
32 See Alan S. Frankel & Allan L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of Interchange 
Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 627, 631 (2006) (“The interchange fee puts a floor under the 
merchant discount. Indeed, since the acquiring side of the business is fairly competitive, one 
can expect changes in merchant discounts to generally reflect changes in interchange fees.” 
(quoting DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC 199 (2d. ed. 
1999))). 
33 See supra note 1. 
34 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 15. Fees for American Express 
and Discover are negotiated directly with merchants, id. at 9 n.8, and are not publicly 
available, see, e.g., Our Pricing, AM. EXPRESS, 
https://merchant.americanexpress.com/accept-card/merchant-account-rates-pricing. 
35 Id. at 14. These figures, indicating total volume of interchange revenue, must be 
taken with a grain of salt as an indication of an increase in interchange fees, as the total 
number of card payment transactions has also increased dramatically of the same time 
period. See supra note 1. 
36 Catherine Clifford, Retailers Score in Swipe Fee Fight, CNNMONEY (June 23, 2010), 
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trend. These trends have led to increased regulatory scrutiny.
37
 
B. Economics of Interchange Fees 
The payment card industry is characterized by economists as a 
two-sided market.
38
 Two-sided markets are those in which one 
intermediary, through the pricing and structuring of the market, 
provides benefits to two distinct types of customers.
39
 While almost all 
markets involve transactions with multiple parties (e.g., a firm with 
suppliers and consumers), two-sided markets are distinguishable in that 
the intermediary—or platform—can affect the volume of transactions 
by shifting the cost of the transaction from one side to the other—i.e., 
adjusting the price structure
40
 (as opposed to simply adjusting the prices 
to each side).
41
 Further, the benefits received by both sets of participants 
increase as the number of participants on either side increases.
42
 
Two-sided markets are prevalent in a variety of settings. This type 
of market is well-illustrated by the matchmaking industry, as in a dating 
club or bar: men are often charged while women may be allowed in for 
 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/23/smallbusiness/small_business_interchange_fees/index.ht
m. 
37 See infra Part III. 
38 See, e.g., James MacAndrews & Zhu Wang, The Economics of Two-Sided Payment 
Card Markets: Pricing, Adoption, and Usage 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Econ. 
Research Dep’t, Research Working Paper No. 08-12) (2008), available at 
www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/reswkpap/pdf/RWP08-12.pdf. 
39 See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 
RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 (2003) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report]; Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EURO. 
ECON. ASSOCIATION 990, 990 (2003) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition]; 
see also Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyen, Two-Sided Network Effects: A 
Theory of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494, 1494 (2005) (identifying the 
practice in industries of discounting or giving away products for free in order to encourage 
the purchase of another product). 
40 Price structures, as distinguished from price levels, refer to how the parties in the 
transaction are charged, not what the parties are charged. That is, instead of shifting a pure 
per transaction cost from the cardholder to the merchant (i.e., making a consumer pay 30% 
of a transaction cost and a merchant 70%), a two-sided market can adjust the price structure 
and make a merchant pay a transaction cost while a cardholder pays a membership fee or 
receives rebates in the form of rewards, and by doing so, increase the volume of 
transactions. See Marc Rysman, An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage, 55 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 1, 7 (2007). 
41  Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, supra note 39at 665. 
42  David S. Evans, It Takes Two to Tango: The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 1 
PAYMENT CARD ECON. REV. 1, 3 (2003). 
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free in order to achieve a balance in the sexes that benefits both types of 
participants.
43
 Another example exists in the video game industry.
44
 The 
manufacturers of video game systems derive their profits from royalties 
paid by game developers, as they sell the game console at cost or for a 
loss.
45
 Developers make more money if more consumers buy the 
console, and consumers benefit if more developers produce games for 
that console. As a result, the console developer must set prices that 
induce both developers and consumers to participate in the market.
46
 
Similarly, the structure of the card payment industry involves 
multiple participants that are coordinated by the card network, which 
serves as an intermediary.
47
 Card payments can be understood as a 
service offered by suppliers—the issuer and the acquirer—to both 
merchants and cardholders, facilitated by a platform in the card 
network.
48
 Issuers and acquirers incur costs in providing this service 
from which merchants and cardholders benefit.
49
 Thus, card networks, 
which set interchange rates, charge a transfer payment. This transfers 
the utility of merchants and cardholders to issuers and acquirers in order 
to encourage them to participate, or in the language of economists, in 
order to “facilitate efficient card transactions.”
50
 Therefore, the card 
 
43 Id. at 3. 
44  Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, surpa note 39, at 645. 
45 Id. at 659. 
46 Id. at 645. Other examples of two-sided markets abound. Perhaps somewhat 
ironically, the “market” for academic journals has been characterized as such a market. 
Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Charles Rochet, The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided 
Market Perspective, 2 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 222 (2010). Many journals provide 
their articles to the public at no charge, but require authors to pay to submit scholarship to 
be published in order to induce wider dissemination of the publications. Id. at 222-23. 
47 Indeed, “multi-sided” might be a more suitable description of the payment card 
industry. See Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, supra note 39, at 645 n.1. Benefits are 
achieved between merchants and cardholders, while card networks intermediate price 
among merchants, consumers, and issuers. 
48 See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some 
Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549, 551 (2002). 
49 Id. 
50 See ROBIN A. PRAGER, MARK D. MANUSZAK, ELIZABETH K. KISER, & RON 
BORZEKOWSKI, FED. RESERVE BD., INTERCHANGE FEES AND PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS: 
ECONOMICS, INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS, AND POLICY ISSUES 15-16 (2009). It is important to 
note that, in the context of a credit card transaction, cardholders are already incurring a cost 
to transact in the monthly fees or finance fees the issuer charges. However, in a debit 
transaction, there are no such costs. In addition, cardholders receive “rebates” from issuers 
in the form of rewards or “cash back” incentives. Thus, the interchange fee can best be 
understood as a charge for means of payment, as opposed to any other service. 
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network must determine the proper level to set the interchange fee in 
order to attract more participants—i.e., “balance demand.”
51
 
In addition, the market provides increasing benefits both to 
cardholders and to merchants as more participate—the more people who 
use cards, the more merchants will want to accept them, and vice-
versa.
52
 Economists refer to this feature of two-sided markets—a 
phenomenon akin to economies of scale—as a kind of “externality.”
53
 
Externalities are defined as “indirect effects of consumption or 
production activity.”
54
 More specifically, the idea of shared benefits in 
two-sided markets is known as a “network externality” or “network 
effects.”
55
 
Another externality that is recognized in a card payment 
transaction is what is referred to as the “usage externality.”
56
 This 
references the fact that participants in a card payment transaction do not 
take account of the other participant’s costs and benefits in taking part 
in the transaction.
57
 The usage externality and the concept of two-sided 
markets are both closely related to the concept of multi-product 
pricing.
58
 However, there is an essential difference in two-side markets. 
Under multi-product pricing, the recipient of a free or very cheap razor 
will be cognizant that he is being charged a high price for razor blades, 
 
51 Id. at 15 (internal quotations omitted). 
52 Evans, supra note 43, at 3. Indeed, both merchants and cardholders derive other 
benefits from electronic card payment transactions besides availability of use, such as a 
reduction in the handling of cash, security, fraud protection, convenience, etc. 
53 Id. 
54 See James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 
371, 372 (1962) (describing an externality as “an external effect” that occurs when “the 
utility of an individual . . . is dependent upon the ‘activities’ . . . that are exclusively under 
his own control or authority, but also upon the single activity . . . , which is . . . under the 
control of a second individual.”). 
55 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 16. The existence of positive network effects, 
while not proven, does extend beyond the theoretical. An empirical study has shown a 
positive correlation between cardholder’s usage of payment cards and acceptance of such 
cards by merchants. Rysman, supra note 40, at 2-3. This correlation is suggestive of a 
positive feedback loop, which is evidence of positive network effects. Id. 
56  Rysman, supra note 40, at 2-3. Two-sided markets often exhibit another sort of 
externality, “membership externalities.” Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, supra note 39, at 
646. In the context of card payments, this sort of externality is only relevant to costs like 
membership fees that are incurred by a cardholder, as in the case of American Express. Id. 
at 647. However, this Article’s focus is primarily on the function of interchange, causing 
membership externalities to less relevant. 
57 Id. 
58 See Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, supra note 39, at 646. 
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whereas in a two-side market, one market participant cannot and does 
not internalize the cost to the other side of the market.
59
 In the context of 
payments systems, a cardholder does not internalize the cost to the 
merchant of processing the transactions using a card versus cash. 
Interchange fees, in theory, are designed to account for both of 
these externalities.
60
 By imposing a transfer payment in the form of an 
interchange fee, card networks strengthen the network and provide 
increasing utility to all participants, enhancing network effects.
61
 And by 
forcing a transfer, card networks enable the transaction to even occur by 
providing an otherwise absent incentive for issuers and acquirers to 
process the transaction.
62
 
Another important concept in two-sided markets is “multi-
homing.” Multi-homing is a scenario where a market participant uses 
multiple networks.
63
 For example, in the videogame industry, a 
developer multi-homes by producing a game for two consoles—e.g., for 
both PlayStation and X-Box—and a consumer multi-homes by owning 
multiple gaming consoles.
64
 In the context of card networks, an issuer 
multi-homes by issuing cards on multiple networks, and consumers and 
merchants multi-home by accepting or using cards on multiple 
networks.
65
 When one side of a two-sided market multi-homes and the 
other does not, it can lead to intense competition on the multi-homing 
side and little to no competition on the side that does not.
66
 
C. Important Network Operating Rules 
In order to regulate transactions, the card networks maintain 
voluminous operating regulations that are binding on the network’s 
participants.
67
 In the case of Visa and MasterCard, these agreements are 
 
59 See id. 
60 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 16-17. For a rebuttal of this assertion, see supra 
Part II.D. 
61 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 16-17. 
62 See id. 
63 Rysman, supra note 40, at 9. 
64 See Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, supra note 39, at 659. 
65 Rysman, supra note 40, at 6. 
66 See Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, supra note 39, at 660. 
67  Visa International Operating Regulations, VISA INC. (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulations-main.pdf; 
MasterCard Rules, MASTERCARD INC. (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/BM-Entire_Manual_public.pdf; American 
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made with member organizations such as issuers and acquirers, who 
then impose any relevant provisions on merchants and cardholders.
68
 In 
the case of American Express and Discover, the operating regulations 
govern issuers and merchants.
69
 
There are two important provisions that have historically been 
maintained in these agreements that have a tremendous effect on the 
way merchants accept card payments and, arguably, the way the 
industry competes.
70
 The first provision is known as the “honor-all-
cards” rule. This rule requires that merchants who accept a type of card 
from a card network must accept all types of that card connected with 
that card network.
71
 Thus, a merchant who accepts a Visa credit card 
must accept all types of Visa credit cards and cannot reject any given 
Visa credit card on the basis of its issuer or a higher interchange fee.
72
 
This rule prevents merchants from accepting only those cards offered by 
a card network that carry relatively lower interchange fees.
73
 
The card networks and their supporters argue that this rule is 
necessary to avoid reducing the level of positive network effects, as 
without it, some cardholders might be denied when making a purchase.
74
 
 
Express Merchant Reference Guide – U.S., AM. EXPRESS CO. (Apr. 2013), 
https://www260.americanexpress.com/merchant/singlevoice/singlevoiceflash/USEng/pdffile
s/MerchantPolicyPDFs/US_%20RefGuide.pdf. 
68 See VISA INC., supra note 67, at 33; MASTERCARD INC., supra note 67, at §§ 1.1-1.2, 
1.5.5. Prior to 2009, these regulations were not even made available to merchants. PRAGER 
ET AL., supra note 50, at 13 n.25. 
69 See AM. EXPRESS CO., supra note 67, at 4. Discover’s Merchant Operating 
Regulations and Acquirer Operating Regulations are not available to the general public but 
instead only to member organizations. 
70 Not all of the four major card networks implement both or any of the procedures 
discussed. 
71 PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 13. This rule is promulgated explicitly by Visa and 
MasterCard. VISA INC., supra note 67, at 395; MASTERCARD INC., supra note 67, at § 5.8.1. 
American Express’s anti-steering provisions arguably achieve the same result. See AM. 
EXPRESS CO., supra note 67, at 14 (“Merchants must not . . . indicate or imply that they 
prefer . . . any Other Payment Products.”). 
72 VISA INC., supra note 67, at 395. The honor-all-cards rule, as implemented by Visa 
and MasterCard, previously required that a merchant who accepted the card network’s credit 
cards also accept the card network’s debit cards. In 2003, Visa and MasterCard, as part of 
the settlement of an antitrust action brought by a class of merchants, agreed to revise their 
honor-all-cards rules to not apply across debit and credit classes of cards. See discussion 
infra III.B.1. 
73 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 14. 
74 David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate 
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 667, 684 (2005); see also 
Levitin, supra note 1, at 1366. 
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This argument, when made today, belies the history of such rules. 
Honor-all-card rules arose in the 1960s, as Visa and MasterCard were 
developing as networks, in order to counter merchant reticence in 
accepting a card from a bank of which it had never heard. At the time, 
banking regulations barred the existence of major national retail bank 
chains.
75
 However, when a consumer attempts to use a card but is 
denied, that cardholder’s consumer welfare is undeniably harmed.
76
 
The second major feature of card network operating agreements 
relates to a family of similar rules, including “no-surcharge rules” and 
“no-discounting rules,” which can collectively be referred to as no-
steering rules or non-discrimination rules.
77
 These rules consist of 
prohibitions imposed by card networks that prevent merchants from 
steering customers away from high-cost forms of payment to lower-cost 
forms of payment, either through the use of surcharges or discounts on 
the price of goods.
78
 While merchants have been able to offer discounts 
to consumers for paying in cash since 1981 under the Cash Discount 
Act,
79
 such discounting is uncommon.
80
 
Similar to honor-all-cards rules, no-steering rules are justified 
primarily on their contributions to positive network externalities. 
Because consumers are more price elastic
81
 in their demand for 
electronic payment cards (consumers have alternatives in cash and 
checks) and merchants’ demand is highly inelastic (merchants must 
accept credit and debit cards or lose some sales), if consumers must 
incur surcharges for the cost of the interchange fee, as opposed to 
 
75 Levitin, supra note 1, at 1367-68. 
76 The credit card industry seems to be straining to maintain non-standardized products. 
See supra Part II.D.2. The honor-all-cards rule, by forcing acceptance of high-end rewards 
cards, helps to keep credit cards from becoming commodities. Id. 
77 Under a settlement with the DOJ, Visa and MasterCard can no longer enforce no-
discounting rules in the United States. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. However, American 
Express has chosen to litigate the same suit with the DOJ in order to preserve its anti-
steering provisions. See AM. EXPRESS CO., supra note 67, at 14. 
78 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 14; Levitin, supra note 1, at 1369. 
79 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a) (2006). 
80 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1350 (recognizing that cash discounting is “rare” and 
“largely confined to the retail gasoline industry”) (citation omitted). One reason why 
merchants do not offer and consumers do not demand cash discounts might be because cash 
is not part of the same product market as debit cards or credit cards. For example, 
consumers use debit cards so they do not have to use cash, and they use credit cards to gain 
access to credit. 
81 Price elasticity of demand is a measure of responsiveness of the quantity of a good or 
service demanded to changes in price. See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1366. 
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merchants, consumers will not use cards and the beneficial network 
effects will be lost.
82
 In addition, the requirement of multiple price 
schedules might lead to less card transactions and thus less network 
effects.
83
 Another offered rationale is that no-surcharge rules prevent 
cash-paying customers from free riding off of the legitimacy that card 
networks signal to consumers about merchants who accept their cards.
84
 
D. Critical Review of Interchange System 
The structure and character of payment card transactions—
interchange, merchant restraints, and their effect on the industry—have 
been the subject of much criticism. Criticism of the industry can be best 
understood in two modes: (1) criticism of the overall structure of the 
industry and its potential for abuse
85
 and (2) criticism of specific 
operating rules as promulgated by the card networks that arguably deter 
competition.
86
 Although the use of these two modes can be helpful in 
comprehending two spheres of criticism, they cannot be understood 
entirely independent of each other, as the existence of one may be 
necessary for the other. In other words, the presence of potentially 
anticompetitive operating rules may be sustaining a potentially 
exploitive system,
87
 or the structure of the payment industry might allow 
for networks to enforce harmful rules.
88
 The payment-card industry can 
also be criticized for the relative concentration within the industry and 
the potential for both an exercise of market power and conscious or 
 
82 See id. 
83 See Richard A. Epstein, The Regulation of Interchange Fees: Australian Fine-Tuning 
Gone Awry, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 551, 583-84 (2005). 
84 Id. This rationale is of specious merit. Most almost all businesses now accept credit 
or debit cards, belying any claim of a merchant’s quality from its acceptance of credit cards. 
See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1363-64 n.134. 
85 See, e.g., Matthew L. Cantor & Jeffrey L. Shinder, Feedback: Interchange 
Amendment is Pro-, Not Anti-, Consumer, AM. BANKER (May 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/interchange-1019685-1.html (describing interchange 
system as a hidden tax on consumers resulting from the market power of the card networks). 
86 See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 1 (advocating for the proscription of merchant restraints 
as a restraint on trade in violation of antitrust laws). 
87 If not for honor-all-cards rules, rewards cards might not exist. See Adam Levitin, 
Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 
11 (2008). 
88 For example, the fact that the card networks unilaterally set common interchange fees 
for all issuers perpetuates the honor-all-cards rule. PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 19. If 
issuers could determine their own interchange rates, they would demand very high rates, and 
merchants would not accept cards at all. Id. at 19-20. 
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unconscious parallelism in the setting of interchange by the largest 
networks (i.e. MasterCard and Visa).
89
 
1. Criticisms of Overall Structure of Interchange 
A critique of the overall industry structure begins with an overview 
of some of the criticisms emanating from the economic community. 
Theoretical economic analysis has identified certain problems with the 
current system of interchange and its determination by the card 
networks. While not all economists agree in their methods or their 
conclusions, a number of common themes are exhibited by the available 
scholarship.
90
 For one, economists recognize that prevailing conditions 
in the industry will tend to lead to inefficient interchange fees.
91
 That 
means that current market conditions, such as merchants’ strong 
incentives to accept cards, will lead to interchange fees that are higher 
than the overall benefits received by consumers and merchants.
92
 One 
factor that could contribute to such a result would be the intense 
competition among networks to attract issuers, as any rise in fees related 
to this competition is wholly unrelated to the externality-reduction 
function of interchange.
93
 Further, profit maximizing card networks, 
cognizant of the two-sided nature of their market, will not tend to effect 
interchange fees that maximize the utility of all participants.
94
 
Indeed, economists’ “theoretical models” seem to be grounded in 
reality—the card networks exercise overwhelming market power over 
merchants. For one, as previously mentioned, merchants’ demand for 
card payment services is extremely inelastic. Electronic payments 
represent over 75% percent of all noncash payments.
95
 In addition, as 
early as 2005, card payments were estimated to constitute over half of 
all the payments made to the retail sector in the United States.
96
 With 
card payments representing such a large portion of all payments, the 
 
89 While this concentration is relevant to many of the anticompetitive features of 
structure of the industry, criticisms of this concentration—as they relate to market power 
and parallelism—is beyond the scope of this Article. 
90 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 21-22. 
91 Id. An efficient interchange fee occurs when the net costs amongst all of the parties 
involved in the transaction do not exceed the net benefits. Id. at 18. 
92 See id. at 21-22. 
93 Id. at 21 n.38. 
94 Id. at 21. 
95 FED SURVEY, supra note 1, at 19. 
96 PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 25. 
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vast majority of merchants—those who sell non-unique goods—are 
guaranteed to lose business if they were to stop accepting cards. 
Merchants have expressed these exact concerns. Merchants offer 
an alternative characterization of the market to that of the card 
networks’, which depicts a “balance of incentives” and a benevolent 
transfer of interchange to preserve network effects.
97
 Merchants assert 
that the card networks have extreme market power over the merchant 
side of the two-sided market.
98
 Because there is substantial competition 
on the issuer side of the market and little competition on the merchant 
side, card networks must cater to the issuer side of the market. This 
reality makes it virtually inevitable that card networks will impose 
supracompetitive interchange fees on merchants.
99
 Where card networks 
characterize their actions as a balancing of incentives, merchants 
characterize these same market conditions as market power.
100
 
As merchants have asserted, competition on the issuer side of the 
two-sided market is indeed intense. One encouragement of this 
competition stems from an antitrust suit brought by the United States 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) against Visa and MasterCard, United 
States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.
101
 As a result of this suit, the two card 
networks in 2003 were required to eliminate exclusionary rules in their 
agreements with issuers that precluded those member banks from also 
issuing American Express and Discover cards.
102
 This action, while 
initiated with the intent of injecting additional competition into the 
payment card industry by preventing Visa and MasterCard from 
excluding their relatively smaller competitors, has only led to higher 
interchange rates due to increased competition on the issuer side of the 
market, i.e., networks competing for issuers.
103
 In addition, because 
American Express generally charges higher interchange rates, after the 
decision, Visa and MasterCard were compelled to raise their 
 
97 See generally VISA, INC., INTERCHANGE: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS, available at 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/interchange-brochure.pdf. 
98 Steven C. Salop et al., supra note 16, at 1. 
99 See id. at 1-2. 
100 Compare id. at 14, and VISA, INC., supra note 97, at 3. The irony of this comparison 
is that card network’s “merchant inelasticity” is virtually synonymous with merchant’s 
“card network market power”—card networks derive their market power from merchant’s 
inelastic demand for card services. 
101 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 2003). 
102 See id. at 234. 
103 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 35. 
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interchange rates to the level charged by American Express to compete 
for issuers.
104
 Further, with interest rates declining significantly over the 
last three decades, thus lowering issuer revenue from finance charges to 
consumers, issuers have likely demanded higher interchange rates to 
make up for the difference.
105
 
From a consumer standpoint, the structure of interchange fees and 
the card networks is a source of much cause for concern. Although 
merchants are charged an interchange fee up front on every transaction 
that is processed, that charge is inevitably incorporated into each 
individual merchant’s cost calculation, similar to overhead or cost of 
goods sold.
106
 If a merchant is in a competitive market, the merchant will 
have to raise its prices to maintain the same profit margin it would have 
without a transaction fee. This phenomenon is known as a pass-through 
and is evidenced by pass-through rates.
107
 In the case of sales tax, 
economists have found there is a pass-through rate of one hundred 
percent or greater.
108
 Therefore, there is a strong inference that the 
interchange fee is essentially passed on to the unassuming consumer. 
Indeed, merchants estimated that the average household paid $427 
towards interchange in 2008.
109
 
Concerns for the consumer can be linked to the economic theories 
that underlie interchange supporters’ best arguments. One of the 
essential themes supporting two-sided markets and a transfer payment 
 
104 Levitin, supra note 1, at 1341. 
105 See Historical Prime Rate, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/historical-prime-rate.htm (last 
visited June 8, 2013); see also BANK OF AMERICA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2010) 
(showing that income from interest was roughly seventy percent of all payment card 
income). 
106 See Credit Card Fees, NACS ONLINE, 
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/RESOURCES/CREDITCARDFEES/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2012) (acknowledging that retail members consider credit card fees to 
be an operating expense). 
107 Pass-through rates are determined by looking at prices both before and after the 
incidence of a tax or other extra charge. See Timothy Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, Sales Tax 
and Price: An Empirical Analysis 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6667, 1998). 
108 See Kai Konrad, Florian Morath & Wieland Müller, Taxation and Market Power 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 2880, 2009). This result, in the case of sales tax, is even more 
likely, according to empirical evidence, in the case of commodities. Besley, supra note 107, 
at 26-27. As card payment services can be identified as commodities, see discussion infra 
Part II.D.2, the incidence of this pass-through is even more likely. 
109 Jessica Dickler, Hidden Credit Card Fees Are Costing You, CNNMONEY (July 31, 
2008, 5:20 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/28/news/credit_card_interchange/. 
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in the form of an interchange fee is the characterization of interchange 
as a cure for the usage externality.
110
 Usage externality, defined as the 
problem of transaction participants’ inability to internalize the costs of 
the other participants, can supposedly be solved by the use of an 
interchange fee under this view.
111
 Proponents of interchange assert that 
merchants and consumers gain benefits and therefore pay for them in 
interchange.
112
 By charging the merchant for the transaction, consumers 
are more likely to use their card to pay, a transaction that results in 
greater net benefits for the two parties.
113
 However, in the multi-sided 
market of payment systems,
114
 issuers are compensated to participate, 
merchants pay the up-front costs, and consumers pay for the transaction 
in higher prices without ever knowing it. Interchange, which is 
supposed to correct the usage externality by charging merchants, simply 
passes costs back on to consumers—only this time, without consumers 
being aware of it.  Therefore, an essential deficiency in the transfer 
payment of the card payment industry is the lack of information 
exchange. Because consumers are completely unaware that they are 
funding the transaction, they cannot internalize interchange. 
A major component in the economically inefficient card payment 
world of transactions is the prevalence of credit cards that encourage 
cardholders to accumulate “rewards.” Citi wants you to earn “Extra 
Cash from Citi.”
115
 Bank of America pushes “Power Rewards.”
116
 Almost 
all issuers have cards that let you earn frequent flier miles, travel 
rewards, or cash back.
117
 These rewards programs are funded by 
interchange.
118
 In fact, forty-four percent of interchange revenue is 
 
110 See supra Part II.B. 
111 See id. 
112 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 7. 
113 Marianne Verdier, Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems: A Survey of the 
Literature, 25 J. OF ECON. SURVEY 273, 276 (2011). 
114 See Rochet & Tirole, Progress Report, supra note 39, at 645 n.1 
115 Citi Introduces Extra Cash – New Rewards Program, PAYMENTS NEWS (May 29, 
2008, 7:40 AM), http://www.paymentsnews.com/2008/05/citi-introduces.html. 
116  Power Rewards, BANK OF AMERICA, 
https://www.managerewardsonline.bankofamerica.com/RWDapp/home?mc=PWRRWD 
(last visited June 8, 2013). 
117 See Rewards Cards by Bankrate, BANKRATE.COM, 
http://www.bankrate.com/funnel/credit-cards/credit-card-
results.aspx?classificationuid=8&childcategoryid=117&childcategory=Rewards%20Cards 
(last visited June 8, 2013). 
118 Dawson, supra note 6, at 9. 
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devoted solely to funding these programs.
119
 And interchange fees can 
vary based on whether a card offers extravagant rewards.
120
 Thus, 
interchange fees are paid directly by merchants—indirectly by 
consumers—and then cycled back around to consumers through rebates 
and rewards.
121
 However, since only forty-four percent is being used to 
fund rewards, consumers are not even seeing half of what they pay 
towards interchange through artificially high prices.
122
 These rewards 
programs induce consumers to use cards to pay for goods, as opposed to 
cash or check, even though they might not need to. This means that 
merchants will incur an interchange fee, even though the merchant may 
not be seeing any additional benefit from the use of a card versus cash 
(i.e., increased sales from consumer’s ability to purchase on credit).
123
 
Another related criticism of the interchange system is that it 
subsidizes consumers who pay with rewards cards at the expense of 
other consumers.  Because credit and debit card usage results in higher 
prices of goods, those consumers who pay for goods and services in 
cash, check, or other low cost forms of payment (even a no-rewards 
credit card) subsidize the rewards program of the consumer who decides 
to pay using a more generous rewards card.
124
 The concept can best be 
understood in the context of cards that offer a certain percentage cash 
back on purchases, e.g., five percent.
125
 The consumer paying with the 
rewards card will receive a five percent discount on his purchase, while 
the cash consumer gets no reward and still pays the artificially inflated 
price.
126
 Notably, this subsidy is regressive in that it disproportionately 
hurts the poor in favor of the affluent because lower income consumers 
are much more likely to pay in cash while higher income consumers 
predominantly use cards with extravagant rewards programs.
127
 
 
 
119 Id. 
120 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1348. 
121 Frankel & Shampine, supra note 32, at 634. 
122 See DAWSON & HUGENER, supra note 6, at 9. 
123 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1347. 
124 See Levitin, supra note 87, at 3. 
125 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1349. 
126 Id. 
127 Levitin, supra note 87, at 3. 
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2. Criticisms of Operating Rules 
There are two operating rules advanced by the card networks that 
have been the subject of much criticism: (1) the honor-all-cards rule and 
(2) non-discrimination rules.
128
 These two rules have been criticized 
primarily on antitrust grounds, as they can be characterized, 
respectively, as illegal tying and an anticompetitive vertical restraint.
129
  
Critics of these rules assert that their elimination could result in an 
infusion of competition into the card payment industry, which could 
remedy the current problems with interchange and issuer market 
power.
130
 
Honor-all-cards rules restrain merchants from making independent 
decisions about what kinds of payment cards they wish to accept. 
Because merchants must accept all types of a network’s cards if they 
want to accept any, honor-all-cards rules force merchants to accept 
cards that have much higher interchange fees than they would otherwise 
accept.
131
 In the absence of such a rule, merchants could simply refuse to 
accept premium cards that carry extensive rewards paired with a high 
interchange fee.
132
 
The honor-all-cards rule also allows issuers to sustain the existence 
of such premium cards. If merchants could refuse to accept high cost 
cards, they could exert economic pressure on issuers and cause banks to 
issue less rewards cards or stop issuing such cards altogether.
133
 Such 
pressure might result in the elimination of the most extravagant rewards 
cards, and if not, the elimination of the honor-all-cards rule would at 
least allow market forces to adjust high-rewards cards’ acceptance to a 
competitive level—that is, such cards would be accepted only where 
consumers demanded their acceptance.
134
 
 
 
 
128 See supra Part II.C. 
129 Levitin, supra note 1, at 1399-1404. 
130 See generally id. (claiming merchant restraints, including both honor-all-card rules 
and no-differentiation rules, distort competition); Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust Economics 
of (and Law) of Surcharging Credit Card Transactions, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 343, 346 
(2009). 
131 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 39. 
132 Id. at 58. 
133 Levitin, supra note 87, at 23. 
134 See id. 
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The card networks defend the honor-all-cards rule primarily on the 
basis that its elimination would reduce consumer welfare and 
correspondingly hurt the positive network effects externality.
135
 This 
concern is partially allayed by the fact that many consumers carry more 
than one type of card.
136
 This is an instance of multi-homing.
137
 Further, 
if there was no honor-all-cards rule, the variety of cards issued would 
likely consolidate to a generic low rewards card, and merchants would 
either accept a network’s cards, or not, assuaging any concerns over 
merchants accepting some networks’ cards and refusing others.
138
 
The honor-all-cards rule, as promulgated by the major card 
networks, has been significantly altered through an antitrust lawsuit. In 
2003, a suit instituted by a class of merchants culminated in the largest 
antitrust settlement in U.S. history.
139
 In addition to over $3 billion in 
monetary damages, Visa and MasterCard both agreed to adjust their 
honor-all-card rules so that debit products would no longer be tied to all 
other products—namely credit products.
140
 The merchants brought both 
section 1 and section 2 claims under the Sherman Act, alleging that the 
honor-all-cards rule, as it stood, constituted per se illegal tying of 
unrelated products. The merchants argued that “Visa, separately and 
together with MasterCard, [was] attempting to monopolize and 
conspiring to monopolize the debit card services market” through the 
tying of debit and credit products.
141
 Both Visa and MasterCard settled 
on the eve of trial.
142
 
This litigation uncovered a fairly devious scheme as effectuated by 
both Visa and MasterCard. As stated by the lead counsel of the 
merchant-certified class, both Visa and MasterCard utilized the honor-
all-cards rule and its market power in the credit card market to force 
merchants to accept the fraud-prone signature debit cards, accompanied 
by “credit card-style interchange rates,” while simultaneously 
 
135 See supra part II.C. 
136 Levitin, supra note 87, at 23. 
137 See supra part II.B. 
138 Levitin, supra note 87, at 24. 
139 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F.Supp.2d 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003), aff’d sub nom 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom 125 S. Ct. 2277 
(2005). 
140 Id. 
141 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 1712568 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
1, 2003), at *2, *6. 
142 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F.Supp.2d at 508. 
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suppressing the more efficient and secure PIN debit product.
143
 Indeed, 
following modification of the honor-all-cards rule as agreed to in the 
settlement, interchange rates on signature debit products reversed the 
trend of continuously rising interchange rates, with rates instead 
dropping significantly and entering more in line with the interchange 
rates of PIN products, presumably to remain competitive with those 
products.
144
 
Perhaps even more detrimental to competition are what are known 
as non-discrimination rules.
145
 These rules, as originally promulgated,
146
 
barred merchants from pricing purchases made with a network’s card 
differently than an alternative form of payment, such as a different card 
on the same network or a competitor-network’s card.
147
 Further, 
merchants are prohibited from adding additional transaction costs onto 
the purchase price of goods—that is, including an extra surcharge to 
encourage consumers to use certain forms of payment.
148
 These rules 
essentially forbid a merchant from expressing a preference for a certain 
form of payment, either expressly or through price.
149
 In addition, 
because merchants cannot inform the purchaser, consumers make 
purchases without any awareness as to the cost of the transaction.
150
 As a 
result, it prevents card networks from competing at the point of sale on 
price, as any other type of product would.
151
 
 
 
143 Lloyd Constantine, Jeffery I. Shinder & Kerin E. Coughlin, In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation: A Study of Market Failure in a Two-Sided 
Market, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 599, 605-10 (2005). 
144 See DAWSON & HUGENER, supra note 6, at 5 (see exhibit 3). 
145 For the purposes of this section, “non-discrimination rules” will cover the entire 
family of rules associated with price differences based on type of transaction, including 
surcharging, discounts, in-kind discounts, and steering. See background infra part II.C. 
146 Visa’s and MasterCard’s no-discrimination rules have been modified by way of 
government antitrust action; however, because American Express’s rule remains intact, the 
underlying concerns related to such rules is still present. See infra Part III.B.1. 
147 See, e.g., Final Judgment as to Defendants MasterCard Int’l Inc. and Visa Inc., 
United States v. Am. Express Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87560 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2001), 
at *15-16 (providing language of Visa’s no-discrimination rule prior to July of 2011). 
148 See, e.g., Visa Inc., supra note 67, at 482. 
149 Tracey Kitzman, A Response: U.S. v. American Express, et al.—Making Everything 
Out of Something, LYDIAN JOURNAL 2 (February 2011), available at 
http://pymnts.com/journal-bak/201/a-response-u-s-v-american-express-et-al-making-
everything-out-of-something-2/. 
150 Id. at 3. 
151 See id. 
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This kind of restriction can be cast in the language of two-sided 
market economic theory.  As discussed, when a two-sided market 
participant subscribes to multiple platforms or networks, it is called 
multi-homing.
152
 When one side of the market multi-homes and the other 
side does not, the side that does will be much more competitive than the 
other and thus will exercise market power.
153
 Empirical evidence shows 
this is precisely the case in payment card transactions. While no study is 
needed to show that issuers multi-home (i.e., issue cards on more than 
one network), empirical evidence shows that consumers typically carry 
more than one network’s card and they predominantly use only one—
i.e., “single-home.”
154
 
Non-discrimination rules represent a tremendous hurdle to the 
prevalence of consumer multi-homing. Consumers hold multiple 
networks’ cards but are not using them; if merchants were free to offer 
price differences at the point of sale, even if very small, consumers 
might react.
155
 If consumers were to successfully multi-home, they might 
exert significant price pressure on card networks, leading to a 
competitive reduction of interchange fees and a more measured balance 
of power between the two sides of the market. 
Non-discrimination rules also prevent another form of competition 
that is less scrutinized.  By forbidding merchants from discriminating on 
price based on the form of payment, these rules not only prevent card 
networks from competing, but also prevent merchants from competing 
on how they price these forms of payment.
156
 In other words, eliminating 
non-discrimination rules would not only infuse competition among card 
networks, but it would lead to increased competition among merchants 
in how they price different forms of payment.
157
 
All of these criticisms, concerning both the overall structure of the 
interchange system and restrictive operating rules, suggest a resistance 
on the part of card networks to commoditize their card payment 
product.
158
 Commoditization refers to a process whereby a product 
 
152 See supra Part II.B. 
153 Id. 
154 Rysman, supra note 40, at 9-10. 
155 See Rysman, supra note 40, at 22 (“[M]any consumers maintain the ability to switch 
networks on short notice by keeping cards from multiple networks.”). 
156 Kitzman, supra note 149, at 2-3. 
157 See id. 
158 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1360-63. 
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becomes undifferentiated and homogenous.
159
 Industries featuring such 
products feature low profit margins and stiff competition.
160
 The card 
payment industry features products that are essentially commodities—
cards offer access to a checking account or a line of credit.
161
  However, 
issuers compete on factors like low introductory rates, balance transfer 
rates, and rewards—perks that are hard for consumers to quantify but 
maintain large back-end sources of revenue from interchange, which 
funds this product differentiation.
162
 To be fair, any rational business will 
fight the forces of commoditization and take efforts to differentiate its 
product by competing on brand image and other intangibles that may 
not confer any real value to consumers. However, when companies 
avoid commoditization, with the result being increased costs for all 
products across the board, are the business justifications overwhelmed 
by concerns for consumer welfare? 
II. Potential Solutions 
In the United States, intervention into the card payment industry 
has taken two very different, alternative forms: direct regulation of debit 
card interchange fees and antitrust lawsuits attacking restrictive 
operating rules. The Durbin Amendment, which establishes cost-based 
price ceilings on what card networks can charge merchants to process a 
debit transaction, takes the more extreme route in the form of regulatory 
price caps.
163
 Alternatively, antitrust lawsuits from both the DOJ and 
private plaintiffs occupy a more free-market approach to intervention by 
eliminating certain anticompetitive behavior and utilizing competition-
based motivations.
164
 These two very different instances of intervention 
 
159 Commoditize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/commoditize. 
160 Levitin, supra note 1, at 1360. 
161 Id. 
162 See id. at 1360-61. 
163 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 46 (“The most extreme form of . . . regulatory 
intervention would involve a regulator directly setting interchange fees . . . .”). 
164 See id. at 43-46, 49. Some have suggested that the unilateral determination of 
interchange fees by the card networks is an antitrust violation and should be eliminated. Id. 
at 46. If this feature were eliminated, merchants and issuers would need to engage in one-
on-one negotiation of interchange fees. This would not only result in large transaction costs, 
but issuers would likely demand much higher interchange fees, resulting in the likely demise 
of payment systems altogether. See id. Because such a change would result in the demise of 
payment systems, it would most likely not survive as an antitrust claim of price fixing due to 
pro-competitive justifications and is thus not discussed further in this Article. See Broadcast 
MCAVOY ARTICLE_FORMATTED 6.13 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:31 AM 
2013] REGULATION OR COMPETITION? 333 
provide an excellent vantage for which to compare and contrast 
alternative forms of regulation. 
Prior to taking an in-depth look at the parameters and goals of 
these two different regulatory regimes, it is worth taking a moment to 
examine the critical differences between credit cards and debit cards and 
how those differences can impact the method of intervention. As an 
initial matter, the two products provide substantially different benefits 
to consumers. For one, debit cards are simply a form of access to a bank 
account.
165
 Alternatively, credit cards give consumers access to credit.
166
 
Based on this reality, in at least some cases, when a consumer uses a 
credit card instead of a debit card, that consumer makes a purchase that 
she otherwise might not have made.
167
 As a result, courts have 
considered the two products to be distinct and to occupy separate 
product markets for the purpose of antitrust law.
168
 Therefore, the 
distinction between credit and debit cards is an important difference to 
keep in mind when selecting a suitable form of regulation, as merchants 
have less to gain from a debit product. 
Another critical difference relates to the consumer’s choice in 
picking a network. When a consumer maintains a debit card, the 
consumer’s bank typically issues the card. Therefore, the consumer does 
not have any choice at all in what network its card is processed on.
169
 
Conversely, consumers are more likely to make a conscious choice 
 
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979). Indeed, the 
Southern District of Florida found that a centrally determined interchange fee was pro-
competitive and essential to the functioning of Visa’s system. National Bancard Corp. v. 
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.Supp 1231, 1259-61 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (finding that a unilaterally 
determined interchange fee “eliminates the costly uncertainty and prohibitive time and 
expense of ‘price negotiations at the time of exchange’ between the thousands of VISA 
members”) (internal quotation omitted), aff’d, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986). 
165
 Visa Debit/Check Card, VISA, INC., 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/cards/debit/index.html (last visited June 8, 2013). 
166  FRB: Consumers Guide to Credit Card, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS.,http://www.federalreserve.gov/creditcard/ (last visited June 8, 2013). Charge cards 
provide benefits similar to a credit card, as their user can access funds otherwise not 
available. See What is a charge card?, AM. EXPRESS CO., 
http://www.americanexpress.com/ireland/personal_cards/american_express_what_is_charge
_card.shtml (last visited June 8, 2013). 
167 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 29. 
168 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 1712568 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
1, 2003), at *2-3, *6-7 (2003) (holding that debit and credit products are distinct for the 
purposes of a section 1 tying claims and that debit products occupy a distinct submarket for 
the purposes of section 2 claims of attempted monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize). 
169 Rysman, supra note 40, at 4-5. 
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when deciding which credit card account they wish to enroll in.  
However, it is unclear whether a consumer will choose their credit card 
based on the card network rather than the issuer, the interest rate, and 
what rewards are offered.
170
 This “consumer choice” difference is 
slightly relevant to the concept of multi-homing. 
A. Direct Regulation: Price Ceilings on Interchange 
1. Durbin Amendment 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“the Act”), enacted in response to the “Great Recession” of the late-
2000s, was signed into law on July 21, 2010.
171
  The massive 
comprehensive enactment embodies the most significant overhaul of 
financial regulation in the United States since the Great Depression
172
 
and was designed “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices.”
173
  Only a few of the Act’s provisions were designed 
to be become effective upon the enactment of the law, and its complete 
enactment requires a cache of regulatory agencies to conduct sixty-
seven studies and draw up 243 different rules.
174
 
Among those provisions requiring some regulatory action is a 
little-discussed amendment that directly regulates credit and debit card 
transactions, “SA 3989,” colloquially known as the Durbin Amendment 
(“the Amendment”).
175
 Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois introduced the 
Amendment on May 12, 2010, which the Senate approved in a 64-33 
vote the following day.
176
 With the exception of Senator Durbin’s own 
introduction of the Amendment, there was no floor discussion or 
debate.
177
 As a result, the Amendment, which arguably had no place in 
 
170 See id. at 5-6. 
171 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
172 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, at i (2010). 
173 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
174 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, supra note 172, at i. 
175 156 CONG. REC. S3651-52 (2010). 
176 156 CONG. REC. S3703-05 (2010). 
177 See id. 
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Wall Street reform bill meant to avoid a future Great Recession,
178
 
passed along with the rest of the Act with little attention.
179
 
The Amendment modifies the Electronic Fund Transfer Act.
180
  The 
Amendment contains two main provisions: (1) the Amendment provides 
the Federal Reserve System with rulemaking power to prescribe 
limitations on interchange fees to ensure that they “be reasonable and 
proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer,”
181
 and (2) the 
Amendment requires that debit cards allow for at least two networks to 
be available process a given transaction.
182
 In addition, the Amendment 
provides for a number of other small regulations that benefit merchants. 
The Amendment prohibits card networks from contractually barring 
merchants from offering discounts or in-kind incentives for using other 
forms of payment, though the incentives must not discriminate between 
cards on the basis of issuer or card network.
183
 The Amendment also 
 
178 Senator Durbin himself recognized that many would regard the Amendment as out 
of place in the Act. 156 CONG. REC. S3696 (2010) (“A lot of people in Congress . . . have 
told me this is the wrong bill to talk about [debit fee reform].”). 
179 Nearly a year after the passage of the Amendment and after significant lobbying 
efforts, Senators Jon Tester (D-Mont.) and Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) offered an amendment to 
an unrelated act that would delay the implementation of the Durbin Amendment. Alexander 
Bolton, Senate Readies for Showdown in K Street Battle Over Rules on Debit-card Fees, 
THE HILL (June 8, 2011), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/165379-
senate-readies-for-showdown-in-years-biggest-k-street-battle. However, the so-called 
Tester-Corker Amendment failed to achieve the sixty votes needed for adoption. Claude R. 
Marx, Senate Rejects Interchange Cap Delay, CREDIT UNION TIMES (June 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.cutimes.com/2011/06/08/senate-rejects-interchange-cap-delay. 
180 Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1084, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et. seq. (2006) (“Amendments to the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act.”). 
181 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2006). Notably, this provision excludes “small issuers,” 
that is issuers with assets less than $10 billion. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6) (2006). This 
exemption has witnessed a lot of criticism, mainly due to skepticism as to its effectiveness 
in protecting small issuers. Silla Brush, Bernanke Says Fed Uncertain on Small-Bank 
“Swipe” Fee Exemption, BLOOMBERG-BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-02-17/bernanke-says-fed-uncertain-on-small-
bank-swipe-fee-exemption.html. In fact, the small bank exemption has even led to a 
constitutional challenge, albeit unsuccessful. See TCF Nat. Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 
1158 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction on the basis 
that disparate impact, equal protection claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits). In 
addition, the interchange fee restrictions exempt government-administered payment 
programs and reloadable prepaid cards under 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7), and allow the Fed 
to make an adjustment to whatever cap it sets for fraud prevention costs under 15 U.S.C. § 
1693o-2(a)(5). 
182 See Pub. L. 111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376 at 2068-73 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1693p, 1693q (2006)). 
183 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
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prohibits card networks from enforcing rules that forbid merchants from 
requiring a minimum transaction amount on a credit card transaction.
184
 
The first main provision vests power in the Federal Reserve to 
regulate interchange fees so they are reasonably related to the costs 
incurred by issuers in providing such services. Following the enactment 
of the Act, the Federal Reserve began meeting with industry 
participants.
185
 In September 2010, the agency solicited industry data by 
distributing surveys to issuers and card networks to determine the costs 
associated with a typical transaction.
186
 Using this information, the 
agency proposed a set of rules and requested comments on the proposed 
rules.
187
 Those proposed rules, relying on a great deal of information and 
influence from the networks and issuers, allowed for a maximum 
interchange fee of $0.12.
188
 The Federal Reserve noted that a cap of 
$0.12 would allow a majority of issuers to recoup the non-fixed costs of 
a transaction,
189
 which when averaged across issuers was estimated to be 
$0.13.
190
 In July 2011, the Fed put forth final rules. Suddenly, the Fed 
reversed positions and determined the maximum allowable interchange 
rate to be $0.21 plus five basis points of the transaction amount—
roughly double the original proposed amount.
191
 
 
§ 920(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). This means that the card networks can no longer bar all 
discounts as was previously the practice, see supra Part II.C.; however, discounting between 
cards from the issuer (i.e., no-frills versus premium rewards) and from different networks 
(i.e., Visa versus MasterCard) can still be prohibited. Thus, this provision of the 
Amendment does little to inject competition between card networks or deter inefficient 
rewards cards. 
184 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 920(b)(3), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
185 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,724 (2010). 
186 Id. at 81,724, 81,725. 
187 Id. at 81,722. 
188 Id. at 81,755. 
189 Id. at 81,737. 
190 Id. 
191 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,467 (2011). The Federal Reserve estimated that the typical 
interchange fee will be $0.24 on an average transaction of $38—exactly double the original 
estimate. Press Release, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (June 29, 2011), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110629a.htm. The 
agency, in computing the $0.21 fixed rate, determined the “per-transaction allowable 
cost . . . of the issuer at the 80th percentile.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,422. Therefore, the Federal 
Reserve largely determined the appropriate interchange rate by selecting a cost figure at the 
very high range based on survey results from issuers. See id. Nowhere does the agency 
acknowledge that issuers may have had an interest in bloating the costs they submitted in 
the survey. 
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In addition to capping interchange fees, the Amendment’s second 
main provision requires the Fed to make rules that require issuers to 
enable debit cards to be processed on more than one network—in other 
words, a rule prohibiting network exclusivity.
192
 
2. Critical Review of Direct Regulation 
This form of direct regulation of fees constitutes a price cap.
193
 
While such forms of regulation will always be decried by some as less 
preferable to free-market determinations of price,
194
 others have 
recognized price caps as conducive to measured benefits. For one, price 
caps tend to encourage companies to reduce costs and become more 
efficient.
195
 By setting a ceiling on how much an issuer can earn from 
interchange, such regulation encourages issuers to improve operations 
in order to earn additional revenue.
196
 Indeed, there is empirical evidence 
that the telecommunications industry, which has used price caps, 
experienced efficiency gains through network modernization without 
any detriment to the financial performance of businesses.
197
 Many of the 
same benefits have also been recognized in regulated electricity 
markets.
198
 Moreover, this form of regulation is simple and cheap from 
an administrative perspective, as all parties involved—issuers, 
networks, and regulators—are required to do little to be in 
compliance.
199
 
This kind of regulation is likely to shift some of the costs 
associated with card payment transactions onto consumers and reduce 
some of the positive network effects associated with two-sided markets. 
 
192 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,468. This provision may also have a major impact on how debit 
transactions are processed and what kind of interchange fee is levied. However, because 
caps on debit interchange fees will likely have a greater impact and the consequences of a 
mandating multiple network processing are less certain, this second provision is largely 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
193 See Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity 
Networks, 7 REV. OF NETWORK ECON. 547, 552-53 (2008). 
194 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Regulation of Interchange Fees: Australian Fine-
Tuning Gone Awry, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 551, 596-97 (2005) (“[D]on’t mess with 
success.”). 
195 See 75 CFR Part 235, at 81,738. 
196 See id. 
197 JAISON R. ABEL, THE PERFORMANCE OF STATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
UNDER PRICE-CAP REGULATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, at iv (2000). 
198 Joskow, supra note 193, at 548. 
199 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,738; PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 47. 
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Because merchant fees will be reduced,
200
 rewards to consumers will be 
reduced and costs to consumers will likely increase.
201
 As cards become 
less attractive, card usage should decline despite the likelihood of 
increased merchant acceptance.
202
 Arguably, this regulation does not 
fully take into account the nature of two-sided markets.
203
 And in fact, 
many have criticized the Amendment for shifting costs to consumers.
204
 
However, these same arguments against price caps—that 
consumers will bear additional costs and card usage may decline—can 
be used to argue this sort of restriction on interchange fees is precisely 
the answer to the problems created by payment cards and two-sided 
markets.  By limiting the amount of interchange that networks can 
charge merchants, issuers will be forced to charge consumers for the 
services associated with payment cards if they cannot recoup their costs 
on the capped interchange fees.
205
 If the benefits to consumers from 
debit card transactions outweigh the benefits to merchants, then a higher 
incidence of cost should fall to consumers.  Further, if the cost burden is 
placed on consumers, issuers will be forced to compete more vigorously 
because consumers are more price-sensitive. Moreover, at present 
consumers are already shouldering much of this cost in the form of 
higher prices, only without realizing it.
206
 
We need not consider these effects on only a theoretical level.  
Indeed, banks have already attempted to shift costs to consumers. Most 
infamous is Bank of America’s (“BoA”) much-touted $5 per month 
surcharge for debit card users,
207
 which BoA dropped after customers 
responded with overwhelming negative feedback.
208
 The BoA episode 
presents an excellent illustration of the principles behind two-sided 
markets and general features of the payment card industry. 
 
200 Because merchant acquirers are competitive, see supra Part II.A., a reduction in 
interchange should reduce the merchant discount. See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 47. 
201 PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 47. 
202 Id. 
203 See generally Epstein, supra note 194. 
204 Sen. Bob Corker, Durbin Amendment Backfires, Opinion, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2011, 
9:26pm), available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66806.html. 
205 See PRAGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 47. 
206 See supra Part I.D.1. 
207 Shanthi Bharatwaj, Bank of America Slaps $5 Monthly Fee on Debit, THE STREET 
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.cutimes.com/2011/06/08/senate-rejects-interchange-cap-delay. 
208 Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, BofA Retreats on Debit Fee, Citing Uproar, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204528204577011813902843218.html. 
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Aside from any cost shifting effects stemming from price 
regulation, the Durbin Amendment may be insufficient to carry out its 
intended effects. Under current law, card networks may be able to 
introduce new fees that, at best, offset their lost revenue from the 
regulation and, at worst, avoid the regulation altogether. Originally, in 
July 2011, following the Fed’s issuance of final rules, Visa announced 
that it would be restructuring how it charges fees on all payment cards 
within its network.
209
 Without revealing the specifics of its intentions, 
Visa said it would move away from transactions-based fees and opt for 
a new “participation fee,” or a monthly fee charged to acquirers.
210
 
Ultimately, the company renamed the fee the Fixed Acquirer Network 
Fee (“FANF”).
211
 The amount of the fee would be based on the number 
and character of the merchants that the acquirer processes.
212
 
Presumably, acquirers will pass the fee onto merchants as they have 
done previously with interchange fees.
213
 The FANF was touted as an 
opportunity for merchants to reduce their total swipe fees on a per unit 
basis. By presenting a fixed cost to merchants, the network is providing 
an incentive to process additional card transactions.
214
 In reality, 
however, the fee is simply an additional cost for merchants in addition 
to the fees that Congress tried to cap. The drafters of the Durbin 
Amendment partially anticipated such attempts to avoid its regulation of 
fees, as it prohibited card networks from using its network fee as a 
rebate to compensate issuers.
215
 However, by implementing a monthly 
fee, Visa would avoid any such restriction.
216
 Visa has said that DOJ is 
investigating the antitrust implications of the fee.
217
 
 
209 Joe Rauch, Visa Rolls Out New Fee Program, REUTERS (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/28/us-visa-idUSTRE76Q6D020110728. 
210 Id. 
211 See Visa to Launch New Acquirer Fee in April that Could Run Up to Big Numbers, 
DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS, Feb. 23, 2012, http://www.digitaltransactions.net/news/story/3439. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Visa’s New Participation Fee: Analysts View, INT’L BUS. TIMES, July 28, 2011, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/visas-new-participation-fee-analysts-view-819191. 
215 See 5 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(8)(B) (2006) (empowering the Federal Reserve Board to 
regulate fees paid to card networks insofar as necessary to prevent its use as means to 
compensate issuers and circumvent the regulation). 
216 In the context of two-sided market theory, such a fee is referred to as a “membership 
fee,” rather than a usage fee. 
217 Kate Fitzgerald, Justice Department Probes Visa Acquirer Fee, ISO & AGENT (May 
4, 2012), 
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In addition, the card networks have expressed that they are not 
going to comply with the spirit of the regulation. For example, both 
Visa and MasterCard have intimated that they will charge the highest 
possible interchange rate that they can on all transactions, even if the 
interchange fee would have been less under the old regime.
218
 This 
means that on a small ticket item, which would have incurred a small 
interchange fee under the old percentage-only fee (e.g., a fee of roughly 
six cents for a five dollar purchase), the card networks will impose the 
Fed’s maximum fee allowable by law of $0.21 plus five basis points. 
This policy will disproportionately hurt merchants who sell large 
quantities of small ticket items to a large extent.
219
 Businesses that sell 
only small dollar amount items will feel a massive dent in their profit 
margins.
220
 
In response to Visa and MasterCard’s expressed intent to charge 
higher fees on lower priced items combined with the Fed’s dilution of 
their original interchange fee cap of $0.12, merchants have brought 
action against the Fed for failing to follow the spirit and intent of the 
Durbin Amendment.
221
 The suit brings action against the Fed under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the Fed put forth a rule that 
“exceeds the statutory authority delegated to [it] by the Durbin 
Amendment and is an unreasonable interpretation of the statute.”
222
 At 
the time of the writing of this Article, summary judgment motions were 
filed and pending.
223
 
Regardless of concerns about avoidance of the Durbin Amendment 
and the capping of debit card fees, the suitability of price caps in the 
context of credit cards is up for debate.  For one, credit cards involve 
 
http://www.isoandagent.com/news/doj_visa_investigat_saunders_durbin_acquir_fee_debit_j
ustice-3010587-1.html. 
218 Dakin Campbell & Donal Griffin, Visa, MasterCard Risk ‘Mom and Pop’ Ire With 
Debit-Fee Increase, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
09-23/visa-mastercard-risk-mom-and-pop-ire-with-debit-fee-increase.html. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. 
221 Press Release, National Restaurant Association, National Restaurant Association 
Joins Suit Against Federal Reserve for Failure to Follow Congressional Intent on Swipe 
Fee Reform (Mar. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.restaurant.org/pressroom/pressrelease/?id=2237. 
222 Complaint at 3, NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 11-cv-
02075 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF No. 1. 
223 See, e.g., Motion for Summary Judgment, NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., No. 11-cv-02075, (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2012), ECF No. 22. 
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many more price points—membership fees, interest charges, 
introductory rates, and increased rewards. Because credit cards have so 
many more opportunities for issuers to generate revenue, any direct 
regulation of interchange will fall prey to the same issues that are 
plaguing the Durbin Amendment, only with greater ease. Issuers, 
instead of relying on the card networks to come up with new sources of 
revenue to replace inflated interchange fees, can merely fine-tune rates 
and fees on the consumer side. 
B. Competition-Based Intervention 
1. Antitrust Lawsuits 
Over the last three decades, the card payment industry has been the 
subject of intensive antitrust scrutiny, both by DOJ and by private 
plaintiffs, with the brunt of that scrutiny being directed at Visa, 
MasterCard, and to a lesser extent American Express. The majority of 
this litigation has focused on potential restraints arising from the card 
networks’ governance structure, interchange fees, and anticompetitive 
effects arising out of merchant restraints. 
Card networks’ use of interchange was challenged as early as the 
mid-1980s. In National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., an acquiring 
bank brought suit alleging that Visa’s unilateral setting of interchange 
rates was a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.
224
 Reviewing the trial court’s ruling for Visa, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed, holding that interchange was not a naked restraint of trade and 
thus not subject to a per se review under Sherman Act jurisprudence.
225
 
Notably, the court did not disturb the lower court’s finding that the 
relevant product market consisted of all forms of payment—including 
cash, checks, and ATM cards—and thus Visa did not possess market 
power at roughly five percent market share.
226
 The court held that a 
centrally determined interchange fee is an ancillary restraint on 
competition and possessed net pro-competitive justifications: “it [is] 
necessary to achieve stability and thus ensure the one element vital to 
the survival of the VISA system—universal acceptance.”
227
 As a result, 
 
224 Nat’l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.Supp 1231, 1236 (S.D. 
Fla. 1984). 
225 Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 603 (11th Cir. 1986). 
226 Id. at 604. 
227 Id. at 605. 
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at an early stage, the payment card networks possessed judicial 
recognition of pro-competitive justifications for interchange. 
Card networks have also become the subject of competition law 
scrutiny as a result of their corporate structures. In the 1998 case United 
States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., the DOJ initiated suit against MasterCard and 
Visa alleging that their structures, then consisting of joint ventures 
among their member banks (issuers), resulted in collusion or price 
fixing in the determination of interchange fees.
228
 While the DOJ was 
unable to show a section 1 violation on the basis of the networks’ 
structure, the presence of such scrutiny likely played a role in the two 
card networks ultimately altering their structure and going public.
229
 By 
going public and instituting a board of non-interested directors to set 
interchange, the two networks will now likely impede any allegation of 
collective price determination.
230
 
The contractual restraints that card networks have placed on 
merchants have also been the subject of antitrust scrutiny. Private 
plaintiffs, consisting of both a class of merchants and individual 
merchants, instituted a suit in 1999 attacking the card networks’ policy 
of tying credit products together with signature debit products through 
the honor-all-cards rules.
231
 On the eve of trial, the card networks, 
perhaps sensing a poor likelihood of success,
232
 settled with the plaintiffs 
for $3.4 billion, the largest antitrust settlement in history.
233
 In addition 
 
228 Complaint at 2, United States v. VISA U.S.A. Inc., 1998 WL 34256236 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 7, 1998). In addition to the DOJ’s assertion of collusion on price, the suit also asserted 
section 1 Sherman Act violations on the basis that card networks’ operating agreements 
prevented issuers from also issuing cards with American Express and Discover. Id. The 
elimination of these rules by the court likely led to an increase in interchange fees and 
additional competition on the issuer side of the market. See supra Part III. 
229 See Levitin, supra note 1. Following the DOJ’s action, Discover instituted its own 
private suit under the same set of facts, which, after the Southern District collaterally 
estopped the defendants from disputing the findings of the previous suit, resulted in a large 
monetary settlement to the tune of $2.75 million. Discover Fin. Serv. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
598 F.Supp.2d 394, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Stipulation & Order of Dismissal, Discover Fin. 
Serv. 598 F.Supp. 2d 394 (No. 98-cv-07076). 
230 See Levitin, supra note 1. 
231 Second Amended Complaint, In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 1999 
WL 34848247 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 1999). 
232 Some commentators have indicated that the mere prospect of a potential judgment of 
the size in question being awarded to the class, along with the trebling provision of the 
Clayton Act, prompted the defendants to settle. 
233 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp.2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003), aff’d sub nom, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied sub nom, 125 S. Ct. 2277 (2005). 
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to the massive monetary settlement, the card networks agreed to 
injunctive relief, which barred them from instituting similar honor-all-
cards rules that tied credit and debit products together in the future.
234
 In 
contrast to the court’s decision in Bancard, in this case the court 
determined that debit cards and credit cards occupied distinct, separate 
markets and the relevant market did not consist of all forms of 
payment.
235
 
No-discrimination rules have also been challenged by both private 
plaintiffs and the DOJ. In 2006, various private plaintiffs’ lawsuits 
against Visa, MasterCard, and major issuing banks were consolidated in 
the Eastern District of New York.
236
 These suits, in a slew of section 1 
and section 2 claims, attack the card networks’ old corporate structure, 
interchange fees generally, non-discrimination rules, and other network 
rules that bundle processing services. The plaintiffs claim that the card 
networks used these tactics to inflate interchange fees.
237
 As of the 
writing of this Article, a settlement between the defendants and class 
had received preliminary approval.
238
  However, numerous class 
members, including large merchants such Starbucks and Wal-Mart and 
large retail trade associations, have opted out of the settlement 
contending that the relief provided in the agreement is not sufficient in 
light of the releases from future litigation provided to the card 
networks.
239
 Primarily, that settlement agreement provides an estimated 
$7.25 billion of relief for class plaintiffs in the form of both cash and 
interchange abatements.
240
 
 
234 Id. at 508. 
235 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 1712568, at *3, *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003). 
236 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 
F.Supp.2d 392, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
237 First Consol. Amended Class Action Complaint, In re Payment Card Interchange 
Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
238 See Class Settlement Preliminary Approval Order, In re Payment Card Interchange 
Fee and Merch.Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ECF No. 1745. 
239 David McLaughlin, Wal-Mart Among Retailers Quitting Visa, MasterCard Deal, 
BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2013 4:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-21/wal-
mart-among-retailers-opting-out-of-visa-mastercard-deal.html; Andrew Longstreth, Opt-
outs of $7.2 Billion Credit Card Fee Settlement Face Risks, THOMPSON REUTERS (June 10, 
2013), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2013/06_-_June/Opt-
outs_of_$7_2_bln_credit_card_fee_settlement_face_risks/. 
240 Christie Smythe, Visa, MasterCard $7.25 Billion Fee Deal Wins Approval, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-09/visa-
mastercard-fee-deal-falls-too-short-retailers-claim. The agreement also removes many non-
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In addition, the DOJ has also instituted actions against Visa, 
MasterCard, and American Express attacking non-discrimination 
rules.
241
 In July 2011, the two four-party-network defendants, Visa and 
MasterCard, agreed to the DOJ’s proposed judgment, which was filed 
simultaneously with the DOJ’s complaint, and the court approved.
242
 The 
agreement provides significant relief through the prohibition of no-
discrimination rules.
243
 However, American Express has decided to 
continue with the litigation.
244
 This is likely due to the fact that 
American Express will be hurt the most by the elimination of non-
discrimination rules. This is because their cards have the highest 
rewards, and consequently, the highest interchange fees.
245
 However, 
Visa and MasterCard’s consent to eliminating the non-discrimination 
rules is only a minor victory until American Express follows suit. This 
is because, as long as American Express holds out, any merchant that 
accepts American Express will still be unable to steer customers 
towards one card over another and inject competition among the 
networks—that is, elimination of Visa’s no-discrimination rules does 
nothing to affect American Express’s no-discrimination rules.
246
   
2. Critical Review of Competition-Based Intervention 
Attempts to alter the card industry through antitrust litigation have 
had varying results.  While industry modifications brought through 
injunctive relief or consent decrees can sound highly effective in the 
abstract, they can also have unintended consequences, such as in the 
case of United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.
247
 In contrast, the elimination of 
the honor-all-cards rule, with respect to debit and credit products, has 
arguably been quite successful—its removal forced interchange on 
 
discrimination rules; however, this relief is coincident with Visa and MasterCard’s 
agreement with the DOJ to remove non-discrimination rules. See infra text accompanying 
notes 240-42. 
241 Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of Section 1 of Sherman Act, United 
States v. Am. Express Co., No. 10-cv-04496, 2010 WL 5594629 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010), 
ECF No. 64. 
242 United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 10-cv-04496, 2011 WL 2974094 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 20, 2011), ECF No. 180. 
243 Id. 
244 At the time of the writing of this Article, the suit was in discovery. 
245 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 1341. 
246 Kitzman, supra note 149, at 4-5. 
247 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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signature debit products to decline drastically.
248
 
In addition, antitrust actions against card networks have embodied 
a variety of forms and have the potential to effect a significant number 
changes to the industry’s landscape.
249
 As a result, it is an effective 
strategy to focus on one or two. The elimination of non-discrimination 
rules, which could be eradicated easily, as demonstrated in the DOJ’s 
consent decree with Visa and MasterCard,
250
 has great potential for 
infusing competition into the merchant side of the two-sided market. 
Their elimination will force card networks to compete among 
consumers on payment choice and enable consumers to exercise “multi-
homing power.”
251
  Due to the potential that this reform possesses, this 
Article confines itself to the analysis of the elimination of non-
discrimination rules and other similar non-steering provisions. 
Regardless of concerns regarding unintended consequences, from a 
theoretical standpoint, the elimination of merchant restraints, in 
effecting greater competition amongst card networks, possesses a great 
deal of merit. Merchants possess little market power towards 
influencing interchange fees, and consumers—with highly elastic 
demand—have the potential to have a great deal of influence. Therefore, 
by eliminating merchant restraints and placing the critical choice among 
competitors in the hands of consumers, antitrust enforcement has the 
potential to bring interchange rates in line with what they would be in a 
competitive market, or at least closer.
252
 
From a practical standpoint, antitrust methods of altering the 
industry suffer from a number of criticisms.  For one, consumers may 
not react to surcharges or discounts in some situations. For example, 
many consumers use credit cards, not because they offer a low cost 
form of payment, but because they offer the extension of credit, 
allowing consumers to make purchases they would not otherwise make 
or permitting them to pay off a large purchase off in increments.
253
 Also, 
even if merchants are permitted to discount, a number of factors might 
 
248 Id. 
249 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2006) (Clayton Act allows consent decrees to take any form 
so long as they are “in the public interest”). 
250 United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 10-cv-04496, 2011 WL 2974094 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 20, 2011), ECF No. 180. 
251 See supra Part II.D.2. 
252 See supra Part II.D.2. 
253 See supra Part III. 
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keep them from doing so. The reluctance to implement a multi-tiered 
price structure on the basis of cost will certainly be a deterrent. In 
addition, merchants might have difficulty identifying which cards incur 
which interchange fees in order to determine what the discount on the 
price might be.
254
 
A far larger concern lies in the potential retaliatory action card 
networks might take against those merchants who decide to implement 
discounting. Many merchants fear the card networks.
255
 In fact, 
merchants have already indicated that card networks have used methods 
of economic coercion to prevent merchants from taking advantage of 
the availability to discriminate between cards, in the form of the 
withholding of preferable rates.
256
 In addition, in the case of small 
merchants, the card networks might be inclined to withdraw from 
servicing merchants who decide to discount. Merchants that find 
themselves the subject of such retaliation will only have the courts as a 
remedy and bringing antitrust actions can be prohibitively expensive.
257
 
Also, large retailers might prefer to leverage their bargaining power 
with the card networks to negotiate lower interchange rates for only 
themselves, rather than utilize discounting to engage competitive forces 
and lower interchange rates for the entire merchant community. 
CONCLUSION 
Both antitrust law and direct regulation of interchange fees possess 
a great deal of potential in effectuating actual improvements to the 
flawed structure of card payment transactions. However, both 
methods—at least in practice—have failed to do so in the execution 
stage. The Durbin Amendment, through its implementation by the Fed, 
 
254 Visa and MasterCard have indicated that they are developing systems that will help 
merchants to execute this. See Jeffrey I. Shinder, Latest Anti-Durbin Amendment is 
Desperate and Absurd, AM. BANKER (June 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Durbin-Desperate-Shinder-1039151-1.html. 
However, whether this system will result in additional costs or delays remains to be seen. 
See id. 
255 See Andrew Martin, How Visa, Using Card Fees, Dominates a Market, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2010) (highlighting data that showed rising interchange fees, which was provided by 
a “large retailer, who requested anonymity to preserve its relationship with Visa”). 
256 See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 
F.Supp.2d 392, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
257 In addition, those on the enforcement side of antitrust can often find themselves in 
the difficult position of having to convince a company to pursue such action or assist them 
in such a pursuit. 
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has led to watered-down rules with abundant loopholes for the card 
networks. The elimination of no-discrimination rules through antitrust 
action—at least at this early stage—has yet to lead to effective 
intervention; its efficacy depends on the results of pending litigation. 
As a result, any future intervention, whether through legislation or 
court settlement, must be forceful and impermeable. Card networks 
have proven themselves to be very adept at avoiding regulation. This 
opportunity for avoidance is largely a byproduct of the inherent 
characteristics of the card payment industry—revenue generation 
involves complicated transfer payments between closely associated 
parties. Therefore, future intervention must contemplate these 
characteristics and include stronger provisions that punish avoidance. 
 
